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Democracy Dies in Dualisms
Dan Sarofian-Butin (Merrimack College)

Abstract
This essay reviews Atkinson’s article “Countering the Neos: Dewey and a Democratic Ethos in Teacher
Education” and argues that while Dewey and the social foundations classroom may indeed be important for teacher preparation, it is not in the way Atkinson suggests. Namely, I argue that Atkinson’s
essay has three distinct (yet interrelated) issues: his problematic oversimplifications, what I term as
“Dewey doesn’t do dualisms”; his misreading of Dewey, where I point out that “Dewey doesn’t do
debate”; and his unexamined positionality, where I make clear that “Dewey doesn’t do Descartes.” I
conclude this essay with a different perspective of a way forward with Dewey: that Dewey’s antifoundationalism serves as a powerful model for teaching and learning that can indeed help us confront the
issues of neoliberalism and neoconservatism that Atkinson rightly worries about.

This article is in response to

P

Atkinson, J. C. Countering the Neos: Dewey and a Democratic Ethos in Teacher Education.
Democracy & Education, 25(2), Article 2. Available at: http://democracyeducationjournal.org/home/
vol25/iss2/2

erhaps it was the extra cup of espresso. As I
finished reading Atkinson’s (2017) “Dewey and
Democracy,” I had this insatiable urge to write a movie
screenplay. It would be a drama, or maybe a romance. All ages
would flock to it. Disney would love it. I would call it “Dewey and
the Beast.”
The opening scene would begin in a blinding snowstorm as
our protagonist—a noble social foundations of education professor
named Dewey—staggers toward the castle where the frightened
student teachers are trapped by the terrifying beast. Just as Dewey
reaches the entrance gates, he pauses and looks straight at the
camera to deliver a soliloquy of utter truth and beauty of how
justice and goodwill shall always triumph when linked to the
greater public good. The music would soar, thunder would roar,
and Dewey would burst inside the castle.
I didn’t, truth be told, get far beyond this opening sequence,
but I was already brainstorming if Secretary DeVos should do a
cameo as the beast, and maybe, just maybe, Matt Damon could be
Dewey. Jason Bourne meets Goodwill Hunting meets Democracy
democracy & education, vol 25, n-o 2

and Education. The symbolism would be profound. Yes, dear
movie-going public, the castle is an embodiment of neoliberalism.
And, yes, the beast represents neoconservatism. And, yes, damn it,
Dewey vanquishes them all! This movie would, as the young folks
say, kick ass.
OK, so I jest about the movie. But my critique is real. Atkinson’s (2017) essay is a fantastic example of the seeming power and
virtue of the social foundations of education and the critical
importance of democratic and participatory practices within
teacher preparation. Yet it is also a fantasy. It ignores and
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oversimplifies the realities within higher education and the
preK–12 educational landscape, misrepresents Dewey, and
assumes that one can somehow speak truth to power from some
external and untainted positionality.
From one social foundations scholar to another, I want to tell
Atkinson (2017) that I wish with all my heart and soul that his
analyses and solutions were spot on. But we must accept that once
the credits roll and the lights come on, all of us must exit the
daydreams of the two-dimensional cinema to confront the glare of
real sunlight. I thus want to push back on Atkinson’s essay as well as
offer my own perspective of a different way forward with Dewey.
Namely, I suggest that Dewey’s antifoundationalism serves as a
powerful model for teaching and learning that can indeed help us
confront the issues Atkinson rightly worries about. We must first,
though, discard what Dewey labeled as our quixotic “quest for
certainty” in order to embrace that democracy is always-already a
process of construction and reconstruction. In the end, we cannot,
as Atkinson suggests, just read Dewey. We must do Dewey.

What Would Dewey Do?
I should begin by saying that I am deeply sympathetic to Atkinson’s
(2017) agenda. Teacher preparation continues to be buffeted by
competing and oftentimes contradictory pressures that force it
toward instrumental goals through prescriptive methodologies
(Ball & Forzani, 2009; McDonald, Kazemi, & Kavanagh, 2013;
Zeichner, Payne, & Brayko, 2015). Social foundations, moreover, is
all too often marginalized or absent in these discussions, debates,
and practices (Butin, 2005a; Hartlep & Porfilio, 2015; Schutz &
Butin, 2013). These issues are long-standing (Butts, 1973; Greene,
1976) and not going away anytime soon (Labaree, 2004).
Atkinson’s (2017) argument thus has a natural surface appeal:
Neoliberalism (the idea that market ideology infuses and suffuses
all social, cultural, and political modes of thinking and acting) has
become intertwined with a Protestant-Christian neoconservatism
committed to the “political restoration of nostalgic American
ideals” (p. 3); this “confluence” destroys all semblance of the
democratic and emancipatory sphere in society in general and
teacher preparation in specific.
This, Atkinson (2017) suggested, is bad. Really bad. “All facets
of life,” Atkinson (2017) argues, have become embodiments of
“goal-oriented, instrumental market relationships” (p. 3). We must
come to realize these linkages—where “schooling is now part of a
corporatized world” (p. 3)—in order to truly understand the
problems in front of us. In fact, he suggests, we have reached
an unprecedented time in our history marked by socio-political
transformation, de-democratization, and the marketization of
schooling that has now set the stage for a complete commodification
of schooling, including the teaching profession . . . Students are not
being prepared to become critical democratic citizens, but rather
docile, obedient workers who have a moral duty to further America’s
competitiveness in a global marketplace. (p. 3)

The solution, Atkinson (2017) argued, is Dewey. Specifically, a
“reexamination and a reintroduction to Dewey’s democratic ethos
within teacher education programs is essential in establishing a
democracy & education, vol 25, n-o 2

critical democratic ideal” (p. 4) because “Dewey’s conception of
democracy provides the potential for a pragmatic response”
(p. 2). Specifically, Atkinson suggested, we must all reread Dewey’s
Democracy and Education and Experience and Education, which
will “help us reevaluate and adjust how we think about educating
future teachers . . . and reconstruct education so as to foster a truly
democratic experience for all students” (p. 7).
This is heady stuff. Atkinson (2017) told us that he was
speaking “primarily to those in the academy” (p. 2), and thus the
reader may feel like we are on the frontlines of a really important
battle, needing to beat back the “jingoistic and authoritarian
models of allegiance and efficiency” (p. 2) and “hegemonic
ideologies” (p. 7) to which our students are being exposed. This is
big. Us versus them. Right versus wrong. Dewey against . . . um . . .
hmmm . . . against the world?
It is here where things start to fall apart. For what becomes
clear is that Atkinson (2017) has created a storyline that fits better
into a movie plot than reality. I want to push back on three distinct
(yet interrelated) issues within his article: his problematic oversimplifications, what I term as “Dewey doesn’t do dualisms”; his
misreading of Dewey, where I point out that “Dewey doesn’t do
debate”; and his unexamined positionality, where I make clear that
“Dewey doesn’t do Descartes.”

Dewey Doesn’t Do Dualisms
Dewey (1938) couldn’t have been clearer: “Mankind likes to
think in terms of extreme opposites. It is given to formulating its
beliefs in terms of Either-ors, between which it recognizes no
intermediate possibilities” (p. 17). For Dewey (1916), a reliance on
dualisms—universals versus particulars, intellect versus emotions,
knowing versus doing, theory versus practice—was ultimately an
act of thoughtlessness, of recourse to simplistic ways of encountering the complexity of our daily lives:
Men still want the crutch of dogma, of beliefs fixed by authority, to
relieve them of the trouble of thinking and the responsibility of
directing their activity by thought. They tend to confine their own
thinking to a consideration of which one among the rival systems of
dogma they will accept. (p. 339)

This was true, Dewey (1938) noted, of both so-called traditional and progressive models of schooling. In fact, he warned that
one must be wary of falling prey to any such dualistic thinking, for
“any movement that thinks and acts in terms of an ‘ism becomes so
involved in reaction against other ‘isms that it is unwittingly
controlled by them. For it then forms its principles by reaction
against them instead of by a comprehensive, constructive survey of
actual needs, problems and possibilities” (p. 6).
Yet Atkinson’s (2017) essay is riddled with such dualistic
assumptions. On one side was positioned those involved in the
idealistic and uncorrupted teacher education profession; on
the other side those who are part of the corporatized and commodified education industry. The former are committed to
democratic schooling, the latter to charter schools. The former are
committed to free inquiry, the latter to patriotism. The former to
“democratic critical citizens,” the latter to “obedient workers.” The
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former are a “revolutionary grassroots movement” and a “counter-
hegemonic force”; the latter . . . well, they’re the hegemony.
But if one begins to scratch the surface to conduct a “constructive survey” of the educational landscape, one will find a lot of
smart and dedicated people with varied ideological positions (e.g.,
Cochran-Smith & Villegas, 2015; Hess, 2002; Goldhaber, Liddle, &
Theobald, 2013). Yes, many of them will disagree on what constitutes a democratic ethos and the role of schools in fostering citizens
willing to thoughtfully engage in creating a better society. But such
dialogue and disagreement is the bedrock of robust inquiry. And
since nobody has yet solved this “wicked problem” (at least as far as
I know), the plurality of thoughtful perspectives can only enhance
our way forward (Hess, 2017).
To put it otherwise, there are very few heroes and even fewer
villains out there. Instead, there are lots of scholars and practitioners going about their daily practices of inquiry and advocacy for
their particular perspectives. Just like Atkinson is doing. Just like
I’m doing. As Dewey (1916) suggested, the principle of free interchange, experimentation, and social continuity is how democracy
thrives. But one cannot do that if there are just two sides to the
story.

Dewey Doesn’t Do Debate
I suggest that Atkinson’s (2017) dualistic framework also forces him
to misread Dewey. It is with some trepidation that I make this
claim, as the Dewey literature is both deep and wide (see, for
example, two recent edited compilations just on Dewey’s
Democracy & Education: Gordon & English, 2016; Waks & English,
2017), and there is no consensus as to whether we should read
Dewey through, for example, Derrida (Garrison & Leach, 2001) or
Jane Addams (Seigfried, 1999). But I’m pretty sure Dewey doesn’t
do debate.
Yet this is more or less what Atkinson (2017) was suggesting. Throughout the article, Atkinson referred to his goals of
using Dewey in order to make “use of multiple perspectives to
move society forward” (p.7). For Atkinson, a “Deweyan pragmatic stance utilizing multiple possibilities and perspectives” (p.
7) is what is truly needed both in teacher education and society
at large. Atkinson based this on his reading of Dewey’s critique
of traditional education to suggest that Dewey argued that
“students should always be offered the opportunity, the democratic right to critically examine the status quo and offer
alternatives” (p. 4).
There are two problems, though, with Atkinson’s (2017)
portrayal of such a seemingly Deweyan openness to “multiple
perspectives.” The first is that Dewey has no interest in “teaching
the controversy,” as if every perspective is as good as any other
perspective. Rather, Dewey (1910, 1934) looked to the scientific
method as the model for inquiry and examination of the world. To
suggest that the goal of education is just to foster alternatives, as a
surface reading of “multiple perspectives” might imply, ignores that
the entire point of the scientific method for Dewey was to gain
clarity and understanding of the pragmatic complexity of our lived
experiences.
Dewey (1910) wrote:
democracy & education, vol 25, n-o 2

The scientist advances by assuming that what seems to observation to be
a single total fact is in truth complex . . . Experiment is the chief resource
in scientific reasoning because it facilitates the picking out of significant
elements in a gross, vague whole . . . Experimental thinking, or scientific
reasoning, is thus a conjoint process of analysis and synthesis towards
understanding and progress. (pp. 150–152; italics in original)

Or as Rorty (1997) phrased it, “Nobody, not even the most far-out
post-modernist, believes that there is no difference between the
statements we call true and those we call false” (p. 23). For Rorty
and Dewey, dualistic mindsets and alternatives for all were flip
sides of the same coin of simplified and inchoate thinking.
Which leads to the second problem with Atkinson’s (2017)
“multiple perspectives” argument. Namely, Atkinson doesn’t really
believe in it either. For what Atkinson really wants is to help those
who are (he believes) implicitly and intuitively on the side of the
hegemony to see it and disavow it. Thus, for Atkinson, the social
foundations classroom is a place to bring up “current issues, discuss
the ideological roots to those issues, and provide future teachers a
chance to determine how they may or may not act on certain deeply
held ideological stances” (p. 8).
So, let’s be honest here: Atkinson (2017) is not suggesting that
those who voted for Bernie Sanders should realize the error of their
liberal ways in order to support the get-out-the-vote effort for
Trump’s reelection. Neither would Atkinson, I imagine, support
Horowitz’s (2002) “academic bill of rights” that calls for “academic
balance” to counteract the liberal bias in the academy (Gross &
Fosse, 2012). Rather, Atkinson’s call for “multiple perspectives” hid
the supranormative foundations of his own positionality. As Biesta
(1998a) pointed out, such “teaching the controversy” is instead
linked to a critical dogmatism whereby the assumptions and
foundations of those on the side of “justice” are “kept out of reach of
the critical operation” (p. 7) of critique.
Yet for Dewey, it is exactly the “critical operation” of thinking
carefully about those “actual needs, problems and possibilities” that
forms the basis of democracy. Dewey thus not only doesn’t do
debate; he doesn’t do debates that are implicitly positioned to have
only one right and objective answer.

Dewey Doesn’t Do Descartes
Atkinson’s (2017) call for “multiple perspectives” revealed the real
problem of his essay: Atkinson’s entire framing is bound by the
Gordian knot of critical theory. Atkinson argued that neoliberal
and neoconservative rationalities “must first be exposed” (p. 7)
since “teachers are losing [the] battle” and “students are becoming
further disempowered to pursue their own interests” (p. 7). The
unstated assumption is that Atkinson, critical theory, teacher
education et al. are all somehow obviously and manifestly positioned on the right side of the battle.
The problem is that such antihegemonic rhetoric has itself
been exposed for its own hegemonies for well over a generation of
feminist and “post” scholarship (e.g., postmodernism, poststructuralism, postcolonialism) (see Butin, 2002). As Ellsworth (1989)
phrased it a quarter century ago, the “key assumptions, goals, and
pedagogical practices fundamental to the literature on critical
article response
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pedagogy—namely, ‘empowerment,’ ‘student voice,’ ‘dialogue,’ and
even the term ‘critical’—are repressive myths that perpetuate
relations of domination” (p. 298; see also Biesta, 1998b). It is thus
problematic that Atkinson can pronounce on the hegemony of
others without acknowledging how he is himself ensconced within
the exact same episteme. “I cannot unproblematically bring
subjugated knowledges to light,” Ellsworth (1989) concluded,
“when I am not free of my own learned racism, fat oppression,
classism, ableism, or sexism” (pp. 307–308). We all, in other words,
breathe the air of neoliberalism.
Atkinson’s (2017) unacknowledged positionality is exactly
what Dewey railed against when he attacked the “spectator theory
of knowledge.” There is no a priori and objective reality, no external
Cartesian vantage point from which to pronounce upon the truth
of reality. Rather, inquiry and experimentation are the sine qua
non of our existence, an antiteleological positionality that make
it clear that knowledge is always-already under construction
(Waks & English, 2017). As Rorty (1987) famously put it, critical
theory’s posturing of objectivity was nothing but an “exercise in
nostalgia.”
This infatuation with nostalgia is, unfortunately, where
Atkinson (2017) ended up. Yet one need only read the history of
education to realize that, for example, students have been passive
for a really long time (Waller, 1932); that schools have been training
students for the workforce for a really long time (Jackson, 1968);
that efficiency and allegiance are built into the very fabric of
modern schooling (Bowles & Gintis, 1976; Tyack & Cuban, 1995);
that calls for resisting the hegemony of schooling’s instrumentalism have been around since way before either Atkinson or I were
born (Counts, 1932/1978). To put it simply, there never was and
never will be some mythic golden age by which to orient ourselves.
We must, instead, find our own way forward.

Dewey Does Democracy
I suggest that if we divest ourselves of the dualities, debates, and
Cartesian quests for certitude, it becomes possible to articulate a
truly Deweyan way forward. Thus, the title of my essay, which is
a riff off the Washington Post’s recent slogan: “Democracy Dies in
Darkness.” While the Post has claimed that the slogan was under
discussion far before the rise of Trump (Scarry, 2017), it feels
apropos of a presidency intent on obfuscation, secrecy, and media
manipulation. The Post’s slogan, it seems to me, signals that truth
and knowledge are verbs rather than nouns. They must be sought
out, investigated, debated, and analyzed. Such inquiry, the Post
seems to be suggesting, is what keeps democracy alive. I would
humbly suggest that democracy not only dies in darkness; it dies as
well in the hegemony of thoughtless dualities.
Social foundations thus has a critical role to play. The foundations classroom is, as I have argued (Butin, 2005b), one of the only
places where students will grapple with the complex and contested
nature of teaching and living within a pluralistic democracy and
where they are forced to “swim upstream” as they confront the
taken-for-granted nature of their assumptions of teaching and
learning. Dewey’s antifoundationalism—the desire to foster
democracy & education, vol 25, n-o 2

“moments of doubt” as a precondition for fruitful
thoughtfulness—is a powerful vision for our pedagogical practices
(Butin, 2010).
This vision is of course easier said than done. One could easily
argue—due to issues such as staffing patterns and high course caps
on introductory courses—that social foundations classrooms are
some of the least democratic or critical spaces in a teacher preparation program: They are all too often textbook-driven, adjunct-led,
lecture-based, and hermetically sealed away from the communities
they are attempting to support and change (Butin, 2004, 2007).
But these realities are not a basis for despair. They are, yet
again, a call for action. I thus want to conclude by returning full
circle to Atkinson’s (2017) introduction, as well as my own.
Atkinson’s analysis of neoliberalism and neoconservatism relied
on Brown (2015), who argued that neoliberalism has eviscerated
any semblance of liberal democracy. “All spheres of existence,”
Brown wrote, “are framed and measured by economic terms
and metrics” (p. 10). But it seems to me—following Dean’s (2005,
2014, 2015) analysis of “communicative capitalism”—that this isn’t
your grandfather’s liberal democracy; rather, there is a troubling
symbiosis between what we call democracy and neoliberalism. As
Dean (2014) wrote:
Communicative capitalism is a material ideological formation . . . the
values heralded as central to democracy take practical, material form
in networked communications technologies . . . Our setting is one of
the convergence of communication and capitalism in a formation that
incites voice, engagement, and participation only to capture them in
the affective networks of mass personalized media . . . This entrapment
in capitalist circuits is the condition of possibility for communication’s
transformation of production. Because contemporary capitalism is
communicative, democratic rhetorics of access, transparency, voice,
discussion, reflection, and participation strengthen the hold of
capitalism in networked societies. Thus, the problems this democratic
rhetoric identifies and the solutions it entails channel political energies
into activities that reinforce the conditions of inequality it ostensibly
contests. Disruptive events, intense debates, are economic
opportunities—ratings drivers, chances for pundits to opine and
opinions to be expressed and circulated—as much as they are political
exercises . . . Democracy is the ambient milieu of inescapable
participatory media. (pp. 148–149)

Dean (2015) read Brown’s (2015) eulogy of democracy both
with more despair and with more hope than Atkinson. The despair
lay in the realization that our very acts of seeming resistance
tighten the grip of neoliberal ideology, in that
words and images [rather than discourse and ideas] circulate, but
they do so shorn of meaning. Because of the communicative
equivalence of utterances, critique loses any efficacy it might have
had . . . the ideals associated with democracy are no longer available
for critical appropriation: demands for greater participation,
inclusion, transparency, consultation, information, and awareness
tighten the grip of communicative capitalism, increasing our
dependence on networked telecommunications, its devices, services,
and distractions. (Dean, 2015, p. 2)
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But the hope lay in the conjoint realization that neoliberalism is
itself an ideology with a “complex entanglement” of its own
“contradictory ideals and practices” (Dean, 2015, p. 3) and is open
to its own breakdowns and ruptures from within. We must see our
world with our eyes wide open if we are to change it.
Which is more or less what Dewey also said about the cinema.
For all of his interest in the aesthetic, Dewey was reluctant to
embrace the cinema because, he believed, it could be used as a
weapon of the elite: “The theater, the movie and music hall,” Dewey
wrote in Freedom & Culture (1939), “have all been brought under
regulation as part of the propaganda agencies by which dictatorship is kept in power without being regarded by the masses as
oppressive” (Seng, 2007). Pope (2011) suggested that Dewey
believed that the infatuation with the cinema “arises in a social
system that itself is discontinuous [between art and life], where
most of the population is disconnected from the deep democratic
life Dewey advocates” (p. 31).
Ouch. So, dear reader, I am here to tell you that there will be
no movie. I will not contact Secretary DeVos or Matt Damon.
Dewey will not enter the castle or vanquish the beast. There will be
no multiplex sequel to Democracy and Education. Instead, I ask all
of us to attend to the complexities, contradictions, and confusions
entailed in helping our students to develop the habits of mind and
repertoires of action to become thoughtful and engaged citizens.
There is much we have done and much we have left to do. Turn
on the lights, throw out the popcorn, and let the real show begin.
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